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Intellectual Property Rights: The Issues
in GATT*
David Hartridge** and Arvind Subramanian*
Abstract
This Article examines the need for a multilateralframework to address
the trade-relatedaspects of intellectualproperty rights (TRIPs). The authors trace the growing importance of TRIPs from its emergence at the
Tokyo Round in 1978 to its present state as a major focus of multilateral negotiations at the Uruguay Round. A detailed discussion of existing
GATT provisions and their relevance to intellectualproperty rightsfollows. The authors then describe thefour major substantive issues related
to TRIPs that are before the Negotiating Group: substantive standards
of intellectual property protection; proceduresfor the enforcement of intellectual property protection; dispute settlement procedures; and the relationship between the GATT and other international organizationsin
the negotiations and in any eventual agreement that may be reached at
the Uruguay Round.
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INTRODUCTION

At the December 1988 Ministerial Meeting held in Montreal to carry
out the Mid-Term Review of the Uruguay Round, the Ministers
reached agreement on eleven of the fifteen subjects under negotiation.' In
some cases these agreements embodied a degree of substantive progress
quite remarkable at the halfway stage in a four-year negotiation. On
four subjects, however, the Ministers failed to agree-agriculture, textiles and clothing, safeguards, and the trade-related aspects of intellectual
property rights, including trade in counterfeit goods (TRIPs). The Ministers decided that the Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC) should
meet in Geneva in the first week of April 1989 to agree upon these
matters and to review the entire package of subjects. This paper addresses itself to one of those four matters-TRIPs-which is the subject
of this symposium.2
TRIPs draws its topicality from the growing importance attached in
recent years to intellectual property matters in multilateral, bilateral,
and unilateral trade policy processes. 3 There is no need to describe the
process that has led to insistent demands in the industrialized world for
higher international levels of protection. In the United States this has
become a highly visible issue of trade policy-by some accounts the high-

1. For details of the meeting and the positions of the parties, see GATT: GATT
Officials Decide to Postpone Conclusion of Uruguay Round Midterm Review Until
April, 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1617 (Dec. 14, 1988); GATT Activities: Midterm Review Ends Without Agreement on Protection of Intellectual Property, 3 World Intell.
Prop. Rep. (BNA) 16 (jan. 1989).
2. At the April meeting in Geneva, the TNC reached agreement on the four outstanding subjects. For a summary of development at Geneva, see GATT: Negotiators
Break Deadlock in Key Areas, Approve Guidelinesfor Uruguay Round Talks, 6 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 442 (Apr. 12, 1989). On this basis, it was possible for the TNC to
approve the decisions taken on all 15 subjects under negotiation, paving the way for the
second and concluding phase of the Uruguay Round. In the case of TRIPs, the agreement will permit substantive negotiation to take place on a commonly agreed agenda,
comprising all the major issues discussed in the latter half of this paper, without prejudging the institutional framework for the implementation of final results. The framework
for negotiation is published in Framework Agreements Adopted April 8, 1989 at
Midterm Review of Uruguay Round Negotiations Under General Agreement of Tariffs
and Trade in Geneva, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 469 (April 12, 1989).
3. See generally INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: GLOBAL CONSENSUS, GLOBAL
CONFLICT? (R.M. Gadbaw & T. Richards eds. 1988) [hereinafter INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS].
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est United States priority in the Uruguay Round." The 1984 and 1988
Trade Acts contain provisions that sanction and in some cases even mandate the use of unilateral actions against intellectual property practices
abroad that the United States identifies as "unfair." 5 A European analogue in the European Community's New Commercial Policy Instrument (NCPI) was introduced in 1984 to counter "unfair" trade practices
abroad.6 The European measure has been used almost entirely in connection with intellectual property matters, whereas the United States
remedy has been invoked in different types of cases.'
The economic developments underlying intellectual property protection concerns are quite straightforward. The established industrialized
economies are losing comparative advantage in some traditional sectors
and are consciously shifting their attention and resources into areas of
greater comparative advantage-activities that are creativity-, research-,
and knowledge-intensive, and therefore intellectual property-intensive.
This fact, together with the emergence of new copying technologies and
the growth of the trade deficit in the United States, has focused attention
on the imitation abroad of domestic technologies and creations." Econom-

4.

In 1984 the United States submitted a report to.the GATT Secretariat, INTERNA-

TIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, THE EFFECTS OF FOREIGN PRODUCT COUNTERFEITING
ON U.S. INDUSTRY: FINAL REPORT ON INVESTIGATION No. 332-158 UNDER SECTION

332(b) OF THE TARIFF ACT 1930, USITC PUB. No. 1479 (1984) [hereinafter ITC
REPORT], which discussed the impact of foreign counterfeiting on the United States economy. See also Bradley, Intellectual Property Rights, Investment, and Trade in Services
in the Uruguay Round: Laying the Foundations, 23 STAN. J. INT'L L. 57, 68-69
(1987).
5. Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, tit. 3, ch. 8, 98 Stat. 2948,
3001 (1984) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2241) (1988); Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness
Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1342, 102 Stat. 1107, 1212 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §
1337) (1988)).
6. Counsel Regulation (EEC)No. 2641184 of 17 September 1984: On Strengthening of the Common Commercial Policy with Regard in ParticularAgainst Illicit Commercial Practices, 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 252) 1 (1984); see EC to Bring ComplaintAgainst U.S. Law in First Use of its Section 301 Procedures, 4 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 408 (Mar. 25, 1987) [hereinafter EC Complaint]; European Community: EC
Submits Proposalsfor Protection of Intellectual Property Rights by GATT, 2 World
Intell. Prop. Rep. (BNA) 136-37 (Aug. 1988) [hereinafter EC Protection].
7. See, e.g., U.S., EC Reach Tentative Solution to Dispute Over Subsidies EC Providesfor Canned Fruit, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 867 (July 5, 1989); U.S. Delays 301
Oilseeds Dispute Until GATT Panel Produces Finding, EC Reacts Sharply, 6 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 894 (July 12, 1989).
8. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. See also CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE GATT NEGOTIATIONS AND U.S. TRADE POLICY (1987); Note, Intellectual
Property Rights and the GATT: United States Goals in the Uruguay Round, 21 VAND.
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ically established countries have perceived these imitations as creating
significant and growing economic losses for corporations operating internationally. Concerned private sector groups, notably in areas particularly
vulnerable to imitation, such as pharmaceuticals, chemicals, and computer software, have sought action by their governments to improve the
protection and enforcement of IPRs abroad.'
The United States and other governments have responded to these
concerns by giving increased prominence in trade policy processes to the
protection of intellectual property. While these processes were initially
mainly unilateral or bilateral in nature, it is not surprising that attention
shifted to the multilateral agenda in the context of the launching of the
new round-a round seen as setting the multilateral framework for the
conditions of international competition into the next century. The United
States, with the support of other industrialized countries, sought to include in the negotiating agenda the issue of intellectual property rights,
along with two other new subjects-trade in services and trade-related
investment measures.1 0 The result for TRIPs was the Negotiating Objective set out in the Punta del Este Declaration. 1"

J. TRANSNAT'L L. 367, 400 (1988).
9. The Uruguay Round File: Trade in Counterfeit Goods and Other Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual PropertyRights, (pts. I & 2), 48 GATT Focus 3, 3-4 (Jul./Aug.
1987), 49 GATT Focus 2 (Sept./Oct. 1987) (Part II).

10. Rivers, Slater & Paolini, Putting Services on the Table: The New GA7T Round,
23 STAN. J. INT'L L. 13, 1$ (1987); Bradley, supra note 4, at 57.

11. The Negotiating Objective reads as follows:
In order to reduce the distortions and impediments to international trade, and taking into account the need to promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual property rights, and to ensure that measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade, the
negotiations shall aim to clarify GATT provisions and elaborate as appropriate
new rules and disciplines.
Negotiations shall aim to develop a multilateral framework of principles, rules
and disciplines dealing with international trade in counterfeit goods, taking into
account work already undertaken in the GATT.
These negotiations shall be without prejudice to other complementary initiatives
that may be taken in the World Intellectual Property Organization and elsewhere
to deal with these matters.
Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round: Declaration of 20 September 1986
(Min. Dec.), in GATT, BAsic INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS [BISD]:
THIRTY-THIRD SUPP. 19, 25-26 (1987) reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 1623, 1626 (1986)
[hereinafter Ministerial Declaration].
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CURRENT PROVISIONS FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
IN THE MULTILATERAL ARENA

To say that intellectual property first appeared on the multilateral
arena at Punta del Este would not be entirely accurate. Apart from certain provisions of the GATT 12 relevant to intellectual property that this
Article will address later, it is worth recalling that the issue of commercial counterfeiting came forth in 1978 at the end of the Tokyo Round."3
Negotiators drew up an agreement on counterfeiting but did not reach
consensus on its incorporation into the final results of the Round, since
only the United States and the European Community were prepared to
support it at that time. 4 The issue surfaced on the GATT agenda in
1982 when the Ministerial Declaration of the GATT Contracting Parties called for an examination of the counterfeit goods issue.1 5 The Declaration sought to determine whether the GATT should take multilateral action on the trade aspects of commercial counterfeiting and, if so,
what it should be. A Group of Experts formed in 1984 to address this
issue was unable to make the necessary determination." Although by
1985 a general consensus prevailed that a growing problem of trade in
counterfeit goods existed and that an improved multilateral framework
was desirable, there was ultimately no agreement as to whether the
GATT should take such action. The difference between these multilateral efforts on counterfeiting and the TRIPs initiative lies in the scope of
commitments sought as well as the different context of discussion.
In major multilateral rounds of negotiation involving many subjects it
is sometimes possible to resolve issues that if negotiated in isolation
would simply be too difficult. In the Uruguay Round agriculture may be
one such case, and TRIPs may be another.1 " The Round offers the cru-

12. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S.
No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, reprintedin 4 GATT, BISD (1969) (Text of the General
Agreement).
13. Note, Countering International Trade in Counterfeit Goods, 12 BROOKLYN J.
INT'L L. 339, 350 (1986).

14.

See Turnbull, Intellectual Property and GATT: TRIPS at the Midterm, 1 J.

PROPRIETARY RIGHTS 9, 10-11 (1989).

15. See Thirty-Eighth Session at Ministerial Level: Ministerial Declaration:
Adopted on 29 November 1982 (LI5424), GATT, BISD: TWENTY-NINTH SuPP. 9, 19
(1983) reprintedin 22 I.L.M. 445, 449 (1983). Signatories to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade are referred to as Contracting Parties, and at present number 98.
16. Note, supra note 13, at 354-55.
17. See Turnbull, supra note 14, at 16.
18. Uruguay Round: Dispute Settlement and Agricultural Reform Proposals
Among New Negotiating Submissions, 58 GATT Focus 6, 6-10 (Nov./Dec. 1988).
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cial possibility of trade-offs between subjects, so that states that see themselves as making concessions in one area can seek countervailing benefits
in others. This is particularly important in TRIPs, where the industrialized countries clearly take the position of "demandeurs." They will not
likely persuade developing countries to undertake new commitments in
the TRIPs area without making significant reductions in the protection
of their own agricultural and textile industries, for example.
Intellectual property matters were not entirely foreign to the GATT
before they became a negotiating issue. Nor is there a legal vacuum insofar as the trade effects of intellectual property protection are concerned.
Apart from certain provisions that refer specifically to IPRs, the General
Agreement contains a number of basic principles that apply generally to
governmental actions affecting trade, including actions in the field of
IPRs. In essence, these provisions forbid discrimination between the
products of different Contracting Parties19 or in favor of domestically
produced goods. 20 The states in the Uruguay Round that have proposed
negotiation of a comprehensive agreement on trade-related intellectual
property matters seem to concur in their desire to apply these basic principles in any new agreement, possibly in a form adapted to the needs of
intellectual property. 2
The most relevant of these basic principles for cases involving the protection of intellectual property is the national treatment principle enshrined in article III of the General Agreement. 22 This provision prevents laws and regulations affecting internal commerce from being
applied in such a way as to afford protection to domestic products or to
give less favorable treatment to imported ones.2 3 There is an important
distinction between the subject matter of the national treatment rule in
the GATT and that in intellectual property conventions. 24 The GATT
19. See GATT, supra note 12, art. I, at A12, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. at
198, 4 GATT, BISD, at 2 (1969) (Most-Favored-Nation Treatment).
20. See, e.g., id. art. III, at A18, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. at 204, 4 GATT,
BISD, at 6 (National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation).
21. GATT Activities: U.S. Submission to the Negotiating Group on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, 2 World
Intell. Prop. Rep. (BNA) 209 (Nov. 1988) [hereinafter U.S. Submission]. GATT: Negotiators Break Deadlock in Key Areas, Approve Guidelinesfor Uruguay Round Talks, 6
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 442 (Apr. 12, 1989); Intellectual Property: EC Presents Detailed Proposalfor GATT Coverage of Intellectual Property Rights, 5 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 1012 (Oct. 19, 1988) [hereinafter EC Proposal].
22. Supra note 20.
23. Id.
24. See, e.g., The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, March
20, 1988, as revised at The Stockholm Revision Conference, July 14, 1967, art. 2, 21
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rule relates to products. The rule in the intellectual property conventions
concerns persons; each member state must accord nationals of other
member states the same protection or treatment as it accords its own
nationals.
The equally fundamental most-favored-nation principle in article I of
the GATT forbids discrimination between Contracting Parties.2 5 The
principal applies to relevant actions of governments in the area of intellectual property rights, as it does to all other rules and formalities affecting the import and export of goods.
Several other GATT provisions can apply to IPR legislation and measures because of their general applicability to trade-related governmental
action. They include, for example, article X2" on the publication and
administration of trade regulations. Far more significantly, however, the
GATT dispute settlement provisions-articles XXII and XX1112 7 -can
be invoked in any case in which a Contracting Party believes its GATT
rights have been nullified or impaired by another government's action in
connection with IPRs, whether or not the action conflicts with GATT
obligations. Four IPR-related disputes have come before the GATT
Contracting Parties and have been the subject of reports by dispute settlement panels. These cases have concerned the United States Manufacturing Clause,28 section 337 of the United States Tariff Act of 1930 (in
two instances), 29 and Japanese labeling practices on imported wines and

U.S.T. 1583, 1585-86, 1631, T.I.A.S. No. 6923, 828 U.N.T.S. 305, 312-13 [hereinafter
Paris Convention], The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
- U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No.
Works, Sept. 1886, as revised at Paris, July 24, 1971,
., 3 WIPO & UNESCO, COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD,
Berne Conv. (Item H) (Supp. 1974) [hereinafter Berne Convention]. The United States
recently passed The Berne Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat.
2854 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988)). See also The International Convention for the
Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations,
Oct. 26, 1961, arts. 2, 4, 496 U.N.T.S. 43, 44-47 (The Rome Convention).
25. Supra note 19.
26. GATT, supra note 12, at A18, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. at 222, 4

GATT, BISD, at 16.
27.

Id. at A64, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. at 266, 4 GATT, BISD, at 39.

28. See United States Manufacturing Clause: Report of the Panel Adopted on 151
16 May 1984 (L15609), reprinted in GATT, BISD: THIRTY-FIRST SuPP. 74 (1983-

84).
29. See Conciliation:United States-Imports of Certain Automotive Spring Assemblies: Report of the Panel Adopted on 25 May 1983 (LI9333), in GATT, BISD:
SuPP. 107, 126-27 (1984); E.I. Dupont De Nemours v. AKZO N.V., 49
Common Mkt. L. Rep. 545, 550 (decision to refer the AKZO dispute to a panel of the
GATT under GATT article XXIII). See also EC Complaint, supra note 6; see generTHIRTIETH

ally Note, Section 337 and GATT in the AKZO Controversy: A Pre-andPost Omnibus
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alcoholic beverages. In a recent case of a different kind, the GATT
Council agreed to set up a panel to consider Brazil's complaint against
measures taken by the United States in retaliation for alleged inadequate
protection of United States patent rights in Brazil."0
Whereas the provisions referred to above do not specifically address
the protection and enforcement of IPRs, certain other GATT provisions
do.
Article XX(d)31 allows Contracting Parties to take measures for the
enforcement of IPRs that normally would be inconsistent with the General Agreement. These measures must be necessary to secure compliance
with intellectual property laws and regulations and may not be applied
in a discriminatory manner or as a disguised restriction on international
trade. 2 The substantive intellectual property law being enforced must
also be GATT consistent. Article XX(d) does not oblige Contracting
Parties to adopt any enforcement measures; it ensures that GATT obligations do not stand in the way of effective enforcement of intellectual
property legislation."
Article IX 34 attempts in its first five paragraphs to ensure that marking requirements are not used to hamper international trade unnecessarily or to discriminate between Contracting Parties. However, paragraph
6 of article IX is designed to promote the protection of intellectual prop-

Trade and Competitiveness Act Analysis, Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 382, 383, 396-98,
400 (1988).
30. See Bliss, The Amendments to Section 301: An Overview and Suggested Strategies for Foreign Response, 20 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 501, 516-17 (1989).
31. GATT, supra note 12, at A61, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. at 262, 4
GATT, BISD, at 37-38.
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between
countries . . . or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures:
(d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement, including those relating to customs
enforcement, the enforcement of monopolies operated under paragraph 4 of Article
II and Article XVII, the protection of patents, trade marks and copyrights, and the
prevention of deceptive practices.

Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at A30, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. at 222, 4 GATT, BISD, at 15
(paragraph 5 in the original version).
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erty."5 It requires Contracting Parties to cooperate and to consult with
each other in order to prevent the use of trade names in ways that misrepresent the true origin of products to the detriment of protected regional and geographical product names. 6
Articles XII(3)(c)(iii) 3" and XVIII(10)38 require that import restrictions employed to safeguard the balance of payments not be applied so as
"to prevent compliance with patent, trade mark, copyright or similar
procedures. '39 Although the Contracting Parties have not interpreted
these provisions, they could relate, for example, to situations in which
import restrictions might prevent a trademark owner from meeting the
use requirement for the maintenance of his right.
No GATT provision obliges Contracting Parties to accord any particular level of protection to IPRs or to enforce them to any particular
degree of effectiveness. Indeed, the only GATT provision containing obligations aimed at promoting the protection of IPRs is article IX(6),
which, as described above, is limited in scope.40 However, when this provision does accord protection, the GATT requires that the substantive
law and the related enforcement measures be non-discriminatory as between the products of different Contracting Parties and not operate so as
to protect or favor domestic products, except where enforcement measures can be justified under article XX(d).
Observers have drawn different conclusions from this analysis. Some
view the lack of any GATT obligation on the level of protection or effective enforcement of IPRs a serious lacuna, suggesting that new rules and
disciplines are required if the GATT is to deal with the trade problems
arising from inadequate or ineffective protection of IPRs. Others feel
that the lack of such obligations in the General Agreement confirms that

35. Id.
36. Article IX paragraph 6 states:
The contracting parties shall co-operate with each other with a view to preventing
the use of trade names in such manner as to misrepresent the true origin of a
product, to the detriment of such distinctive regional or geographical names of
products of the territory of a contracting party as are protected by its legislation.
Each contracting party shall accord full and sympathetic consideration to such requests or representations as may be made by any other contracting party regarding
the application of the undertaking set forth in the preceding sentence to names of
products which have been communicated to it by the other contracting party.

Id.
37.
38.
190, 4
39.
40.

Id. at A37, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. at 230, 4 GATT, BISD, at 19.
GATT, art. XVIII:10, 8 U.S.T. at 1781, T.I.A.S. No. 3930, 278 U.N.T.S. at
GATT, BISD, at 31.
Id.
See supra notes 34, 35, and accompanying text.
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the proper concern of the GATT in this field is confined to ensuring that
measures taken to protect intellectual property do not constitute barriers
to legitimate trade."
The work of the TRIPs Negotiating Group, structured around the
three paragraphs of the Negotiating Objective agreed to by the Ministers
at Punta del Este,' 2 comprises four elements: the examination and clarification of existing GATT provisions as they apply to IPRs; the identification of the trade problems or distortions arising in connection with
IPRs; the assembly of information, with the assistance of WIPO and
other organizations, on existing national and international law on IPRs
and a discussion thereof; and the tabling of specific proposals by several
participants on different aspects of IPRs with a view to undertaking
binding obligations in the GATT."3
III.

THE NEGOTIATING ISSUES

Summarizing the negotiating issues in a subject as diverse and com-

plex as this is difficult, particularly since it involves a great deal of overlap between issues. But one can probably say that, in addition to the
GATT provisions discussed above, the Group has before it four major
substantive negotiating issues, namely:
(1) substantive standards or norms of IPR protection;
(2) procedures under national law for the enforcement of IPR
protection;
(3) dispute settlement procedures between parties to any eventual agreement on TRIPs;
(4) the relationship between the GATT and other relevant international
organizations, including WIPO, concerning TRIPs and the relationship between an eventual agreement in the Uruguay Round and the
existing intellectual property conventions.
This Article will deal with each issue in turn.
A.

Substantive Standards

The most difficult and contentious of these four issues is that of substantive standards for the protection of IPRs. The industrialized countries share a similar conception of the trade problems arising in the field
of standards."" They believe that trade distortions and economic losses to
41.

See Ministerial Declaration,supra note 11 (reprinting text).

42. See id.
43.
44.

See, e.g., EC Protection, supra note 6; ITO REPORT, supra note 4.
For a discussion of the problems from the perspective of the United States, see
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their companies operating internationally can arise from either inadequate or excessive levels of intellectual property protection, although
most of the concrete examples given relate to the former. Typical examples of perceived inadequate intellectual property protection have included the total or partial exclusion of inventions in certain areas (such
as pharmaceuticals and chemical products) from patent protection, short
durations of patent protection, and excessive compulsory licensing and
patent forfeiture provisions.45 Perceptions of inadequate standards are
not restricted to patents but also extend to other IPRs such as copyright,
where the laws of some states do not protect computer software or the
works of foreign nationals.4 6 Some of the specific proposals tabled envisage the negotiation of commitments to observe agreed levels of protection
for a wide range of IPRs. There are, however, significant differences
between these proposals in the coverage of IPRs and the specified standards of protection suggested.4 The IPRs covered are patents, copyright
and related neighboring rights, trademarks, industrial designs, trade
secrets, the -layout design of semi-conductor integrated circuits, and geographical indications, including appellations of origin.4

Gadbaw & Gwynn, Intellectual Property Rights in the New GATT Round in
LECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS,

INTEL-

supra note 3, at 38-88. See also Note, supra note 8, at

392; U.S. Framework Proposals to GATT ConcerningIntellectual Property Rights, 4
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1371 (Nov. 4, 1987); U.S. Submission, supra note 21; U.S.
Firms Lose Billions Annually to Foreign Piracy, ITC Intellectual Property Study
Finds, 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 290 (Mar. 2, 1989). For the views of other developed

nations, see Note, International Intellectual Property Protection:An Integrated Solution to the Inadequate Protection Problems, 29 VA. J. INT'L L. 517, 525-33 (1989)
[hereinafter Integrated Solution]; GATT: Intellectual Property is Priority Issue for
Midterm Review, Canadian Officials Say, 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1402 (Oct. 19,

1988); E.C. Proposal, supra note 21; Intellectual Property: Nordic Countries Attempt
to Break Deadlock on Bringing Intellectual Property into GATT, 5 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 1402 (Oct. 19, 1988); Note, supra note 8, at 397-98; EC and Japan Present

Intellectual Property Proposalsfor Uruguay Round Negotiations, 4 Int'l Trade Rep.
1499 (Dec. 2, 1987); GATT Activities: Nordic Countries Try to Break Deadlock on
Intellectual Property Issues in GATT, 2 World Intell. Prop. Rep. (BNA) 213 (Nov.
1988) [hereinafter Nordic Countries].
A useful history of the progression to the Uruguay Rounds and the development of the
issues to be addressed here, including international protection of international property
rights within the GATT context, can be found in Bradley, supra note 4.

45. Dam, The Growing Importance of International Protection of Intellectual
Property, 21 INT'L LAW. 627, 627-28.
46.
47.
4 Int'l
48.

Id. at 630.
Compare U.S. Submission, supra note 21, with EC Proposal,supra note 21 and
Trade Rep. 1499 (Dec. 2, 1987) (EC & Japanese Proposals).
See EC Proposal, supra note 21.
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A different approach from that suggested in the proposals is the establishment of a basic GATT commitment to avoid trade distortions or impediments caused by excessive or inadequate protection of IPRs; this
general commitment would be made concrete by the negotiation of indicative lists describing situations that would establish a rebuttable presumption of nullification or impairment of benefits.
The proposals have met opposition from some developing countries.49
These states argue that the level of protection accorded to intellectual
property by any country represents a balance between a number of conflicting national considerations; thus, protection is a function of a country's domestic situation and the various national policy objectives-social,
developmental, and technological-that intellectual property laws are
designed to serve. Since trade policy is only a minor consideration to the
developing countries, they doubt the appropriateness of negotiating on
standards in the GATT context and also question how far some of the
standards issues raised are truly trade-related. They also argue that, contrary to the third paragraph of the negotiating mandate, which requires
that the negotiations not prejudice other complementary initiatives taken
in WIPO or elsewhere, the elaboration of standards in the GATT would
prejudice the work of WIP0 50 and other relevant organizations.5" Other
states have stressed, however, that their proposals on substantive standards are consistent with the international conventions administered by
WIPO. 2 Articles 19 and 20 of the Paris5 3 and Berne"4 Conventions,
respectively, explicitly allow member countries to conclude agreements
providing for higher levels of obligation so long as they are consistent

49. See, e.g., European Community: EC Submits Proposalfor Protectionof Intellectual PropertyRights by GATT, 2 World Intell. Prop. Rep. (BNA) 136, 137 (Aug. 1988)
(Brazilian and Indian Reactions). For an account of the patent and copyright laws of
various developing countries, see collected essays in INTELLEGTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS,
supra hote 3, at 109-378; see also Note, Integrated Solution, supra note 44, at 533-41;
GATT: Uruguay Round Groups Remain Deadlocked as GATT Midterm Review Nears,
Sources Say, 5 Int'l Trade Rep. 1468 (Nov. 9, 1988); Latin America: Group of Eight
Summit Nations Agree to Unify Negotiating Positions in GATT's Uruguay Round, 4
Int'l Trade Rep. 1502 (Dec. 2, 1987).
50. See generally Integrated Solution, supra note 44, at 540; see also Conferences:
State Department Program Examines "GATT and Intellectual Property," 31 Pat.
Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 497, 498 (remarks of Jacques Gorlin that GATT
reform alone is an insufficient solution).
51. See supra note 10; Nordic Countries, supra note 44.
52. See, e.g., EC Proposal,supra note 21.
53. Paris Convention, supra note 19, at 1583, 1609, 1660, T.I.A.S. No. 6923, 828
U.N.T.S. 305, 356-57.
54. Berne Convention, supra note 19, at 221, 250-53.
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with the existing provisions of those conventions.
As mentioned earlier, some critics have argued that the proposals of
the industrialized countries entail a departure from the basic orientation
of GATT provisions, which require that if Contracting Parties do protect intellectual property, they must do so in a way that avoids creation
of obstacles to legitimate trade or discrimination between other Contracting Parties. 5 5 In this light, these states believe that a central point
for negotiations should be trade impediments or distortions arising from
the abusive use of intellectual property rights.
Underlying this divergence are substantive economic considerations relating to the level of intellectual property protection that countries see as
appropriate to adopt in their national legislation. In some important respects the standards of intellectual property protection currently prevailing in developing countries resemble those that prevailed in the developed world until quite recently. These differences of perception are
particularly acute in the field of technology and depend on whether a
state sees itself, in the short and medium term, as a net importer or a net
exporter of technology. 5e For exporters, higher intellectual property protection in foreign markets secures markets that might otherwise be supplied by cheaper substitutes.5" This increases prices and profits, contributes to the recovery of research and development costs, and is generally
perceived to create substantial benefits. Some technology importers believe that low levels of intellectual property protection in their markets
reduce the cost of acquiring technology, thereby reducing foreign exchange outflows in the form of royalties, fees, and profits.58 This may
reduce costs of production and facilitate the creation of less monopolistic
market structures, all of which result in lower consumer prices. Furthermore, the local working provisions embodied in the patent law of many
55.

See supra note 34-36 and accompanying text.

56. Bullitt & Lagomarsino, Protecting Intellectual Property Rights Abroad: New
Uses for PoliticalRisk Insurance and Standby Letters of Credit, 5 INT'L TAX & Bus.
LAw. 283, 284 n.8 (1987). These authors point out that developing countries see that the
amount of money they pay for patent and copyright licenses is decreasing in proportion
to the capital transferred to them in the form of investment. Id. at 283 n.4. Fearing
retrogression to the disadvantaged position they held during the colonial era, they struggle to maintain greater control over technology transfers. Id. at 284 n.8.
57. Accord Simon, U.S. Trade Policy and Intellectual Property Rights, 50 ALB. L.
REv. 501, 501 (1986) ("[W]hen products are pirated from foreign markets, they reduce
United States exports to those markets.").

58. See generally Byington, Planning& Draftingof InternationalLicensing Agreements, 6 N.C.J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 193, 194-95 (1981); Griffith, The Republic of
Ireland's Foreign Investment, Licensing and Intellectual Property Law: A Guide for
the Practitioner,12 N.C.J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 1, 24.
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states are perceived as promoting the development of local industry and
facilitating the diffusion of skills and know-how. Technology exporters
reply that states according low levels of intellectual property protection
suffer disadvantages stemming from the reduced incentives for innovation
by foreign and domestic firms and for the transfer of technology by foreign owners of technology.59
Much work remains for narrowing the differences in view and determining the desirable level of intellectual property protection. This makes
TRIPs unlike most of the other subjects for negotiation in the Uruguay
Round. Even in agriculture and textiles the negotiators would agree, at
least in principle, that it is necessary to move towards'more open markets and the acceptance of normal GATT disciplines. In TRIPs, however, there is no consensus that higher levels of intellectual property protection would benefit all participants.
B.

Enforcement

°

Based on the conclusion that trade distortions arise from ineffective
enforcement as well as from inadequate standards, the comprehensive
proposals tabled have sought the negotiation of multilateral commitments
to embody certain procedures and remedies for the effective enforcement
of IPRs in national legislation. The proposals at the same time seek to
ensure that enforcement measures are not "excessive" in the sense that
they do not constitute disguised non-tariff barriers to, or discriminatory
restrictions on, international trade.2 The proposed enforcement measures would comprise both border and internal measures, with greater
emphasis on the latter on account of their superior effectiveness in coun63
tering the problem of IPR infringement at the point of production.
Border measures, though also necessary, are inevitably more limited and
involve a greater risk of creating barriers to legitimate trade. Some propose that commitments on enforcement should specify the IPRs and the

59.

See MacLaughlin, Richards & Kenny, The Economic Significance of Piracy, in

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS,

60.

supra note 3, at 89-108.

The GATT enforcement system's scope and limitations are discussed in Roessler,

The Scope, Limits and Function of the GATT Legal System, and Ladreit de Lacharri~re,
The Legal Frameworkfor International Trade, in TRADE POLICIES FOR A BETTER
GATT AND THE URUGUAY ROUND 71, 95
(1987) [hereinafter LEUTWILER REPORT]. See also Note, supra note 8, at 385-90.
61. See, e.g., U.S. Submission, supra note 21, at 211.
62. Id. at 211-13 (Section 511 of the United States proposal states: "[p]arties shall
ensure that procedures to enforce intellectual property rights minimize interference with
legitimate trade.").
FUTURE: THE 'LEUTWILER REPORT,' THE

63.

Id.
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type of infringement against them that should be covered, the procedures
available to title holders to enforce their rights in a timely and equitable
manner, the remedies and sanctions in the event of infringement, and the
safeguards to reduce the risks of creating barriers to legitimate trade.6 4
Not all, however, share this approach to enforcement issues. A general
consensus was expressed in the Punta del Este Declaration on the need
to create a multilateral framework of "rules and disciplines [on] international trade in counterfeit goods." 65 Some feel that such a framework
will provide answers to most of the real trade problems that have been
identified-particularly if the coverage of such an agreement could be
extended beyond trademarks to include goods infringing copyrights, for
example. 6 A number of developing countries have expressed willingness
to consider such an extended definition of counterfeiting.6 7 However, for
many states a commitment on internal enforcement measures would be
substantially more difficult, both practically and in principle, than border enforcement. Views also differ as to whether rules on counterfeit
trade should be part of a comprehensive agreement on the trade-related
aspects of intellectual property rights or whether they should be treated
separately by the Negotiating Group. Some participants see counterfeiting as essentially an aspect of the enforcement issue which, together with
substantive standards, constitutes the main element of an agenda for addressing the trade distortions arising in connection with IPRs in the
GATT. But others see the control of trade in counterfeit goods as an
issue in itself by virtue of its separate treatment in the Punta decision.
The second major aspect of the enforcement issue involves ensuring
that procedures are not used as disguised restrictions on legitimate trade
or as means of discrimination. All of the parties agree that this is a matter for consideration in the Negotiating Group, although there is need
for further inquiry into whether new rules are necessary and, if so, what
they should be.

64. See, e.g., id.
65.

Supra note 11.

66. See, e.g., Uruguay Round: Dispute Settlement and Agricultural Reform Proposals Among New Negotiating Submissions, 58 GATT Focus 6, 8 (Nov./Dec. 1988)
[hereinafter Reform Proposals].
67.

Turnbull, supra note 14, at 10 (Indian proposal would have GATT negotiations

on counterfeiting continue).
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C. Dispute Settlement 8
We now turn to the issue of the procedures for settlement of disputes
between governments over their respective public international legal obligations in connection with intellectual property rights. This should be
clearly distinguished from the topic of enforcement, which concerns the
procedures for the settlement of disputes between private parties over
their obligations under national law in connection with IPRs.
The issue of dispute settlement involves two concerns: alleged inadequacies and alleged excesses.6 9 The first reflects the widespread view that
the present system of public international law concerning the protection
of IPRs does not provide an effective method of settling disputes between
governments. ° The GATT has a well-tested and functioning dispute
settlement procedure; normal GATT practice ensures that international
commitments are meaningful by providing procedures for monitoring
their implementation by signatory governments and for 'resolving disputes between such governments.71 Some states have proposed that commitments negotiated on TRIPs should be subject to a dispute settlement
procedure based on existing GATT practice, with possibly some adaptations to take account of the special requirements of disputes in the intellectual property area. 2 Some other states in the negotiations fear that
dispute settlement procedures specifically connected to TRIPs would involve a linkage between obligations on the standard of IPR protection
and rights to market access, through the possibility of authorized retaliation. This fear exists despite the fact that in the GATT's forty year
history only two requests for the authorization of retaliation have come
forth, and the Council granted only one of these. In that case, which
dates back to the 1950s, the Contracting Party involved, the Netherlands,
did not make use of the authorization to retaliate against the United
68. See generally Bliss, GATT Dispute Settlement Reform in the Uruguay Round:
Problems and Prospects, 23 STAN. J. INT'L L. 31 (1987). Ladreit de Lacharrihre, The
Settlement of Disputes Between Contracting Parties to the General Agreement, in
LEUTWILER REPORT, supra note 59, at 119.
69. See Ladriet de Lacharriare, supra note 68, at 120.

70. See Integrated Solution, supra note 44, at 521.
71. For a summary description of the GATT dispute settlement procedure see,
among others, article XXIII of the GATT, supra note 12, at A64, T.I.A.S. No. 1700,
55 U.N.T.S. at 266, 4 GATT, BISD, supra note 12, at 39 see UnderstandingRegard-

ing Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance, Adopted 28 November 1979 (L14970), GATT, BISD: TWENTY-SIXTH Supp. 210 (1978-79) and more
recently, Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement Procedures, GATT Doc. No.
L/6489.

72. Reform Proposals,supra note 66.
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States. 3
The flip side of the dispute settlement coin embodies concern over
what some countries see as excessive national procedures for the settlement of intellectual property-related disputes with other states. In large
part, although not exclusively, this concern is directed to section 301 of
the United States Tariff Act.74 Thus, for many participants, both developed and developing, it is an important objective that multilateral dispute settlement procedures effectively replace the unilateral pressures
and measures that states have increasingly been using. It is indeed hard
to see why many states should accept new multilateral commitments in
this area if they remain vulnerable to unilateral actions.
As described earlier, states have already invoked the GATT dispute
settlement machinery in four cases related to intellectual property law
and its enforcement. 5 Some participants in the negotiations have therefore argued that the existing system already operates satisfactorily to
prevent discrimination or the creation of barriers to legitimate trade and
that no further provisions are needed.
D.

The Role of WIPO and Other InternationalOrganizations

The respective roles of GATT and WIPO are an important issue in
the discussions and proposals put forward."' These arguments can be
clarified by distinguishing between the role of WIPO and other organizations such as UNESCO and UNCTAD during the negotiating process
and the role they might play in the implementation of its results.
The Trade Negotiations Committee regulates the input of WIPO, the
Customs Corporation Council, and UNCTAD by inviting these organizations to attend Negotiating Group meetings and to provide appropriate
technical support on request. Thus far, WIPO and other organizations
have provided valuable technical input to the work of the Negotiating
Group, including information on national and international laws on
IPRs, and on current work in those organizations on matters of relevance to TRIPs.
The question of the possible role of other international organizations
in implementing the final result is, as yet, open. The Punta del Este
73. See GATT, BISD: FIRST Supp. 32-33.
74. See Bliss, supra note 30; see also Bliss, supra note 68, at 43-45.
75. Supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
76. "A number of developing countries maintain that the GATT is not the proper
forum for addressing the issue of international intellectual property protection ... arguing that exclusive jurisdiction in this area belongs to WIPO." Integrated Solution, supra
note 44, at 540.
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Declaration calls for the Ministers to make decisions regarding the international implementation of results in all areas of the negotiations at the
end of the Round."
IV.

CONCLUSION

This paper has traced the emergence of TRIPs as an issue for multilateral negotiations in the Uruguay Round. It has attempted to spell out
briefly the manner in which existing GATT provisions apply to IPRs
and to describe the substantive issues that have emerged thus far in the
work of the Negotiating Group on TRIPs.

77.

See supra note 11.

